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Abstract
It is something of a puzzle that politicians around the world have
choosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby re-
ducing their possibilities to ￿ne-tune the economy. In this paper the
determinants of central bank independence (CBI) reforms are studied
using a new data set on the possible event of such reforms in 119 coun-
tries. According to the data, as much as 81 countries had implemented
CBI-reforms during the study period. Tne results indicate, moreover,
that policymakers are more likely to delegate power to independent
central banks when the foreign debt is relatively high. In non-OECD
countries, the likelihood of a CBI-reform also seem to increase when
policymakers face a high probability of getting replaced.
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11 Introduction
Over the two last decades a number of countries, ranging from New Zealand
to Lesotho, England, Kazakhstan, Sweden and Chile, have implemented
institutional reforms which grant their central banks more independence
from the political process. It is, however, something of a puzzle that political
policymakers choose to give up control over monetary policy when they know
that monetary policy (at least in the short run) in￿ uence employment and
production levels.
There exist a number of theoretical explanations. It has been suggested,
for example, that central bank independence (CBI) reforms should occur
in countries with high and persistent in￿ ation (Rogo⁄, 1985), where price
stability has already been achieved (Cukierman, 1994), where the govern-
ment debt is relatively high (Max￿eld, 1997), where the political system is
characterized by a high degree of competition (Cukierman, 1994), where the
￿nancial sector is relatively in￿ uential (Posen, 1993), and so on.1
However, the question why political policymakers choose to delegate au-
thority to central banks has (as far as we know) never been tested empiri-
cally. Previous empirical studies (de Haan and Van￿ t Hag, 1995; Cukierman
and Webb, 1995; de Haan and Siermann, 1996; Bagherei and Habib, 1998)
have instead used various CBI-indices to investigate what determines a given
level (i.e., not a change) of CBI. This means that these studies only can
explain cross-country di⁄erences in CBI, while the more interesting ques-
1A number of other explanations have also been suggested in the literature (for an
overview, see e.g., chapter ￿ve in Eij¢ nger and de Haan, 1996). The possible determinants
of central bank independence reforms are thourougly discussed in the next section, while
the empirical proxies that are used in this paper are presented in Section 3.
2tion concerning why policymakers choose to implement CBI-reforms remain
unanswered.
The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of CBI-reforms
using a new data set that contain the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms
in 119 countries. According to the data, 81 of the 119 countries had im-
plemented a CBI-reform during the period 1980-2005. Thus, the literature
on the time-inconsistency of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977;
Barro and Gordon, 1983), together with Rogo⁄￿ s (1985) suggestion that
political policymakers should delegate power to a central bank with more
in￿ ation averse preferences, seem to be one of the most in￿ uential macro-
economic ￿ndings in recent time.
The results presented in the paper indicate that countries with a high
foreign debt ratio are more likely to implement CBI-reforms. In addition,
in non-OECD countries, the likelihood of a CBI-reform seem to increase
when policymakers face a high probability of getting replaced. Countries
that are members of the European Union (EU) and the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA) also seem more likely to delegate power to
independent central banks if other countries in these organizations recently
have implemented such institutional reforms. On the other hand, CBI-
reforms seem unrelated to the level of in￿ ation.
In the next section, possible determinants of CBI-reforms are discussed.
The data used in this paper are described in Section 3. Section 4 then
describes the econometric speci￿cation, while the results are presented in
Section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes and draws conclusions.
32 Determinants of central bank independence re-
forms
It is commonly believed that CBI-reforms should reduce the in￿ ationary
bias of policy and make a low in￿ ation rule credible. Kydland and Prescott￿ s
(1977) and Barro and Gordon￿ s (1983) work on time inconsistency in mon-
etary policy, together with Rogo⁄￿ s (1985) suggestion that a central bank
with more in￿ ation averse preferences can make a low in￿ ation policy cred-
ible, constitute the theoretical rationale for this belief.
Various empirical studies (e.g., Alesina, 1988; Grilli et al., 1991; Cukier-
man et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Jonsson, 1995; and Eij¢ nger
et al., 1998) have also found a negative correlation between an index re-
￿ ecting the degree of CBI and average in￿ ation. Alesina and Summers
(1993) could not ￿nd any correlation between CBI and unemployment, real
economic growth, and real interest rates. As a result, there is a broad con-
sensus that CBI improves the likelihood of achieving a low in￿ ation goal at
no real economic costs.
Note that achievement of price stability, according to the time incon-
sistency theory, cannot be explained by a pre-commitment to central bank
autonomy. If announcement of a CBI-reform is su¢ cient for achieving a
low-in￿ ation goal, then it is optimal for the political policymakers to violate
this promise when price stability is achieved (McCallum, 1997). Thus, the
time-inconsistency theory and empirical work on the correlation between av-
erage in￿ ation and CBI suggest that CBI-reforms are implemented because
policymakers want to achieve low and stable in￿ ation.
4On the other hand, Cukierman (1994) have suggested that CBI-reforms
may be implemented to maintain low in￿ ation, i.e., as a committing device
against future uncarefull policymakers. This implies that political policy-
makers implement CBI-reforms when they already have achieved a low and
stable in￿ ation. Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) found, by comparing the
implementation dates of central bank independence reform with the long
term in￿ ation trends for 29 OECD-countries, that price stability had been
achieved in most countries before their central banks did become more in-
dependent. This constitute support for Cukierman￿ s (1994) argument that
CBI-reforms can be used as an instrument against future uncarefull policy-
makers.
According to the time-inconsistency model of monetary policy, the ben-
e￿ts of surprise in￿ ation is directly related to the gap between the policy-
makers unemployment target and the natural rate of unemployment. This
implies that an institutional reform that delegates autorithy to an indepen-
dent central bank is more valuable for the policymakers when the natural
rate of unemployment is relatively high (Cukeriman, 1994; Eij¢ nger and
Schaling, 1995).
It has, moreover, been suggested that CBI-reforms are implemented,
especially in developing countries, to signal creditworthiness to foreign in-
vestors (Max￿eld, 1997). Many developing countries have problems with
high debt ratios. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to an inde-
pendent central bank may signal creditworthiness to foreign investors. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) may also demand more central bank au-
tonomy as a prerequisite for obtaining more funds. Max￿eld (1997) presents
5some descriptive results indicating that CBI-reforms are implemented in de-
veloping countries in order to signal creditworthiness.
Political factors may also in￿ uence the decision to delegate power to in-
dependent central banks. According to Cukierman (1994), countries that
are characterized by a high degree of regime political instability are less
likely to delegate authority to independent central banks. Irregular changes
of government due to revolutions, coup d ·etat etc often occur in these
countries, implying that policymakers mainly are concerned with its own
survival. On the other hand, when the politicians in o¢ ce fear that they
might lose power in the next election, central bank independence reforms
may be implemented to reduce the decision-power of the incoming govern-
ment. Moser (1994) has presented some evidence indicating that countries
characterized by extensive check and balances (i.e., multiple veto players)
have more independent central banks.
Posen (1993) argued that the observed negative correlation between the
degree of CBI and in￿ ation is illusionary. The reason is that in￿ ation and
degree of CBI primarily is determined by ￿nancial opposition to in￿ ation,
suggesting that CBI-reforms are implemented in countries where the ￿nan-
cial sector is relatively in￿ uential. Analogously, CBI-reforms are also more
likely to be implemented in countries where public opposition to in￿ ation
is relatively strong. Posen (1993), Forder (1996) and Hayo (1998) have all
argued that CBI and the commitment to a low in￿ ation rule is jointly deter-
mined by social attitudes, i.e., CBI is an endogenously determined variable.
This suggests that independent central banks are successful in implementing
low and stable in￿ ation merely because their independence re￿ ects a social
6attitude that supports low in￿ ation.
3 Data
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is a qualitative variable
indicating whether a CBI-reform has been implemented in a particular year.
Implementation years of CBI-reforms are, however, not readily available
anywhere. Therefore, to obtain dates of CBI-reforms, all central banks listed
in the Morgan Stanleys Central Bank Directory 2004 were contacted by e-
mail. The e-mail contained the following questions: (i) Has your country
implemented any institutional reforms that grant your central bank more
independence from elected policymakers? (ii) If yes, when? (iii) Where can
we ￿nd more information about this?
This means that we consider legal reforms that decreases the in￿ uence
of politicians on monetary policy making as CBI-reforms. The de￿nition
employed in this paper thus includes legal reforms that safe-guardes the low
in￿ ation goal in the legislation, decreaes the possibilities for the government
to override the central bank￿ s decision on its operating targets, put restric-
tions on the governements opportunities to use central bank credits in order
to ￿nance budget de￿cits, decreases the possiblities to dismiss a central bank
governor, increases the terms in o¢ ce and the number of members of the
central bank￿ s governing body for monetary policy, and so on. A statement
that price stability is the only goal for the monetary policy is not regarded
as su¢ cient. Note also that our study focus on a change towards more CBI,
while the magnitude of the reform is undetermined.
7In total, 164 central banks were contacted and 95 central banks ￿nally
answered the questionnaire, corresponding to a respondent rate of 58 per-
cent. A formal analysis of the response rate (with a simple probit model)
show that the probability of response is increasing in GDP and decreasing
for countries belonging to the Asian, South-American and the African con-
tinent compared to those belonging to the Australian, European and the
North-American continent (statistically signi￿cant results at conventional
levels). The analysis further indicate that a country￿ s in￿ ation rate does not
seem to a⁄ect the probability of response.2
Other means of information (e.g., central bank publications, central bank
acts, and scienti￿c articles) were used to validate the e-mail answers and
to obtain the relevant dates of CBI-reforms for the countries that did not
respond to the e-mail questionnaire. The ￿nal sample used in this paper
consist of 119 central banks. This means that we have information about
the occurrence of CBI-reforms in 73 percent of the countries that initially
were contacted by e-mail.3
A list of all countries included in the ￿nal sample can be found in Table
A1 in the Appendix. Note that 81 of the 119 countries studied in this paper
have implemented institutional reforms which grant their central banks more
independence from the political policymakers. This means that CBI-reforms
have been one of the most signi￿cant trends in international politics during
the last decades. It also illustrates the in￿ uence of the time-inconsistency
2The response rate analysis is hampered by a lack of data, in particular for the countries
failing to respond to the e-mail questionnaire.
3The various sources that were used to classify whether and when a particular country
has implemented a CBI-reforms can be found at www.hui.se, choosing research and then
HUI Working Papers. The paper is listed as HUI Working Paper No 13.
8literature on policy outcomes around the world.
The time trend in the number of CBI-reforms around the world during
the period 1980-2005 is displayed in Figure 1. New Zealand is often con-
sidered to be the ￿rst country that implemented a CBI-reform when they
implemented the Reserve Bank Act in 19894, thereby substantially reducing
the politicians ability to produce surprise in￿ ation. New Zealand was soon
followed by others. CBI-reforms started to increase in 1991 when three coun-
tries (Belize, El Salvador and Hungary) delegated power from their elected
policymakers to the central bank. An all-time high number was reached
in 1998 when twelve countries launched institutional reforms that granted
their central banks more independence from the political policymakers. As
can be seen from Figure 1, CBI-reforms have continued to be implemented
after 1998.
- Figure 1 About Here -
The frequencies of CBI-reforms over the sample period for OECD and
non-OECD countries are shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. In the
OECD-countries, CBI-reforms started in 1989 (New Zealand) and reached
the highest number in 1998, when ten countries within Europe implemented
such institutional reforms. For the members of the ESCB (European System
of Central Banks), this increase may be explained by the outline of the
Maastricht Treaty where their national central banks were required to be
independent before the ESCB￿ s establishment date. In recent years other
prospective members of the European Monetary Union (e.g., Czech Republic
4For more information on the regime shift in New Zeland and the Reserve Bank Act,
see Evans et al. (1996), Silverstone et al. (1996), and Daunfeldt and de Luna (2001).
9and Polen) have also granted their central banks more independence from
the politicians.
- Figure 2 About Here -
In Figure 3, the number of CBI-reforms is displayed separately for coun-
tries within the more developing non-OECD countries. This ￿gure re-
veals some interesting geographical patterns. Non-OECD countries were
the ￿rst to implement CBI-reforms, explaining the increase in CBI in the
beginning of the 1990s (Figure 1). Most of this increase in CBI happened
in South-America. In 1995, seven non-OECD countries (￿ve countries in
South-America, one in Asia, and one in Africa) implemented institutional
reforms to increase the independence of their central banks. The sum of
CBI-reforms in the non-OECD countries declined after 1995, but a second-
wave of CBI-reforms started in 2002. This increase can mostly be attributed
to an increase in CBI in Asia and Africa.
- Figure 3 About Here -
In the empirical study the reform year is indicated by one and all previous
years with zeros. This is done in order to avoid explaining the period after
the CBI reforms. Hence, the individual series ends the same year as the
CBI reform. The dependent variable contains a large amount of zeros. The
frequency for the full, OECD and non-OECD samples are displayed in Table
1. The amount of zeros are 96.7, 95.5 and 97.2 percent for the full, OECD
and non-OECD samples, respectively.
-Table 1 About Here -
10In order to study why countries choose to implement CBI-reforms, we
control for both economic characteristics, political factors, and spatial de-
terminants.
Economic characteristics used in the empirical analysis are in￿ ation mea-
sured by the annualized percentage change in consumer prices from IMF
Financial Statistics, unemployment rates obtained from the International
Labor Organization (ILO), gross domestic product per capita (GDP) in US
dollar and the foreign debt ratio from the World Bank￿ s World Development
Indicators. In addition, the strength of the ￿nancial sector is measured by
liquid liabilities as percentage of GDP using data from the World Bank
(Beck et al., 1999). All the economic variables are lagged one period to
avoid endogenity problems.5
Political variables that are used in the empirical analysis to capture po-
litical determinants of CBI-reforms are political fragmentation in the parlia-
ment, whether the country is federation or not, and the level and variation of
political freedom in the country. These variables are obtained from Lundell
and Karvonen￿ s (2003) Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions.6
The use of implementation dates in the empirical analysis does not take
into account that the degree of CBI di⁄er from one country to another. It
is, for example, possible that the CBI-reforms in some countries predate the
study period. Therefore, the value of the CBI-index developed by Cukier-
5We have also tried to lag all the economic variables two and three periods., respectively.
All qualitative results remain the same. The results are available from the authors upon
request.
6The purpose of the data set is to gather information on political institutions around
the world since 1960. The data is compiled at the Department of Political Science, ¯bo
Akademi, in collaboration with Professor Torsten Persson at the Institute of International
Economic Studies, Stockholm University.
11man et al. (1992) is used to analyze whether the event of a CBI-reform
depends on the initial level of CBI. Finally, the number of CBI-reforms in
the European Union (EU), the African Economic Community (AEC), the
Asian-Paci￿c Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA) in the previous period is used to control for
possible spatial e⁄ects (e.g. politicians in the same economic cooperation
may be in￿ uenced by each other) concerning CBI-reforms.
A problem when working with macro-data for the large amount of coun-
tries considered in this paper concerns missing data. In Table 2 the number
of missing observations in the full, OECD and non-OECD samples are dis-
played. As can be seen the problem is largest for the non-OECD sample.
This in particular concerning the variables corresponding to unemployment,
foreign debt, federation and political fragmentation. For the OECD (full)
sample the problem is largest concerning the variables liquid assets and for-
eign debt (foreign debt and unemployment).
-Table 2 About Here -
Since missing data (if not missing at random) can obscure the results
mean imputation with an EM-algorithm is used (see e.g. Little and Rubin,
1987). Means and standard deviations for the imputed samples are displayed
in Table 3. The variables included are further discussed in Section 4.
- Table 3 About Here -
124 Empirical model
To investigate why policymakers choose to implement central bank indepen-
dence reforms we de￿ne the unobserved latent reform pressure in country





Here Xit and Zit are vectors of economic respectively political variables
that are assumed to a⁄ect the CBI-reform pressure, while ￿0
j and ￿0
k are the
corresponding parameter vectors. The error term is speci￿ed as "it = ￿i+￿it,
where ￿i denotes country speci￿c unobservable e⁄ects and ￿it is a random
error. In the speci￿cation of a probit random e⁄ects model it is assumed
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7Estimation results for random e⁄ects Logit as well as linear probability models with





and ￿ is the distribution funtion for a standard normal variate.
The vector of economic explanatory variables, Xit, consist of proxies
for economic factors that are assumed to in￿ uence the decision to delegate
authority to an independent central bank. In￿ ation in country i is included
to study whether CBI-reforms are more likely to be implemented in countries
with high in￿ ation or in countries that already have achieved a low and stable
in￿ ation. In the latter case we expect in￿ ation to be negatively related with
the event of a CBI-reform, while in￿ ation should be positively associated
with independence reforms if CBI mainly is implemented to make a low
in￿ ation policy rule credible and thereby reduce in￿ ation.
The bene￿ts of surprise in￿ ation and the credibility of a low policy in￿ a-
tion rule is in the time-inconsistency model assumed to be determined by the
gap between the policymakers unemployment target and the natural rate of
unemployment. Therefore, unemployment is included to control whether a
relatively high natural rate of unemployment makes surprise in￿ ation more
bene￿cial and thereby reduces the likelihood of a CBI-reform or whether it
strenghteen the need for an institutional reform that makes the central bank
more independence from the political policymakers.8
The foreign debt as a percentage of GDP is also included as an explana-
tory variable. As discussed in Section 2, countries may voluntary or more
or less involuntary be forced to implement CBI-reforms in order to signal
8The actual unemployment rate tends to follow the natural rate of unemployment (see
e.g., Elmeskov, 1994) and is, therefore, used as a proxy in the empirical analysis.
14creditworthiness to foreign investors. Hence, the likelihood of a CBI-reform
should be higher in countries with relatively high debt ratios.
Zit include political factors that are assumed to in￿ uence the decision
to make the central bank more independent. For example, regime political
instability is assumed to reduce the probability that a CBI-reform is imple-
mented. Regime political instability is approximated with the degree and
variation of political freedom in country i based on the annual ratings of
political rights and civil liberties reported by Freedom House. As discussed
in the previous section, we use the data compiled by Lundell and Karvonen
(2003) where the number 1 represent the highest degree of freedom and 3
the lowest. The level of political freedom is in the empirical analysis mea-
sured by two dummy variables. The ￿rst dummy variable takes the value
one if country i is characterized by a high degree of political freedom (i.e.,
freedom index=1), and zero otherwise; while the second dummy is equal
to one if the level of political freedom is low in country i (i.e., freedom in-
dex=3). A moving variance series for a window length of three years is used
to capture movements in political freedom within the country. As political
policymakers in countries with a low level and high variation of political
freedom might be concerned with their own survival, it is expected that
central bank independence reforms are less likely to be implemented in such
countries.
On the other hand, countries with high party political instability are
expected to be more eager to implement central bank independence reforms.
When the government fear that they soon might be replaced, they have the
opportunity to tie the hands of the next government by delegating power
15to an independent central bank. Party political instability is measured by
the degree of political fragmentation in the parliament using Rae￿ s index of
party system fractionalization. A value of zero indicate that one party has
all the seats in the parlament, whereas a value of 10,000 indicate that each
party only has one seat in the parlament. In the latter case, the country is
characterized by a very high level of party political instability.
The degree of ￿scal federalism is included as a dummy variable taking
the value one if country i is a federation. Moser (1994) argues that coun-
tries with a high degree of federalism are more likely to have an independent
central bank, suggesting that the likelihood of a CBI-reform should be pos-
itively related to the degree of ￿scal federalism. As noted by Posen (1993)
and Hayo (1998), CBI may also be determined by the degree of ￿nancial
- and public opposition to in￿ ation. Financial opposition to in￿ ation is
approximated with the liquid liabilities in country i9 as percentage of GDP
using the database on ￿nancial development and structure compiled by Beck
et al. (1999). We expect that the ￿nancial sector is relatively in￿ uential in
countries that have a large ￿nancial sector, creating a positive correlation
between the likelihood of a CBI-refom and liquid liabilities in country i.
The decision to implement a CBI-reform may also be in￿ uenced by the
initial level of CBI. It is, for example, possible that countries that already
have established independent central banks (e.g., Germany) are less likely
to implement CBI-reforms. The CBI-index developed by Cukierman et al.
(1992) is, therefore, included as an explanatory variable in the estimated
9Liquid liabilities includes currency, demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks
and other ￿nancial intermediaries.
16model.
Finally, in order to control for spatial e⁄ects, we also include an interac-
tion term measuring whether countries that are members of the European
Union (EU), the African Economic Community (AEC), the Asian-Paci￿c
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Latin American Free Trade As-
sociation (LAFTA) are more likely to launch CBI-reforms if many other
member countries implemented such reforms in the previous period.
5 Results
The results from the estimation of the probit random e⁄ect model are pre-
sented in Table 4 below. As discussed previously, di⁄erent factors may in￿ u-
ence the decision to implement CBI-reforms in industrialized and developing
countries. Results are, therefore, also presented separately for OECD and
non-OECD countries.
An analysis of the generalized residuals (based on Gourieroux et. al.,
1987) for the random e⁄ects probit models show no residual autocorrelation.
Further, a likelihood ratio test for the models estimated on each of the
samples where used to assess the overall performace (against a constant
only speci￿cation). The LR-statistic (with 15 d.f.) where 55.73, 31.95 and
38.55 for the full, OECD, and non-OECD sample, respectively. Thus, the
LR-tests indicate that the estimated models are signi￿cant at conventional
levels.
Table 4 About Here
17As can be seen from Table 4, countries that are characterized by high for-
eign debt ratios seem more likely to implement CBI-reforms than countries
with lower foreign debt ratios. This support the descriptive results previ-
ously presented by Max￿eld (1997), indicating that political policymakers
choose to give up power to independent central banks in order to signal
creditworthiness to foreign investors. Note that this e⁄ect is statistically
signi￿cant at the 5% level for both OECD and non-OECD countries.
The time-inconsistency theory (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and
Gordon, 1983; Rogo⁄, 1985) implies that a CBI-reform must be implemented
in order to improve the credibility of a low in￿ ation goal, suggesting that
CBI-reforms are implement to reduce in￿ ation. On the other hand, Cukier-
man (1994) and Daunfeldt and de Luna (2008) have argued that central
bank autonomy may have been institutionalized at a time when the policy-
makers have a commitment to low in￿ ation and used as a committing device
against subsequent governments. In this case, we expect that CBI-reforms
are implement when in￿ ation is low. The results presented in Table 4 does
not support any of these hypotheses as the estimated in￿ ation parameter is
negative, but not statistically signi￿cantly determined. This suggests that
the level of in￿ ation has no in￿ uence on the decision whether to grant the
central bank with more independence from the political policymakers.
In fact, no other economic determinant of CBI-reforms is statistically
signi￿cantly determined at any conventional signi￿cance level for the full
sample. The gross domestic product is negative and statistically signi￿-
cant at the 10%-level when estimations are performed for the sub-sample of
OECD-countries, suggesting that OECD-countries with relatively low GDP
18per capita are more likely to implement CBI-reforms. A possibly explana-
tion is that countries such as Hungary, Polen and Turkey, in recent years
have implemented CBI-reforms to harmonize their legislation with the more
industrialized OECD-countries. Thus, creating a negative relationship be-
tween GDP per capita and the likelihood of a CBI-reform. This explanation
is supported by Cukierman et al. (2002), who noted that policymakers in
formal socialistic countries choosed to create central banks with a very high
level of CBI when they transformed their legislation.
Turning to the political determinants of CBI-reforms, the results indi-
cate that non-OECD countries characterized by a high degree of political
fragmentation are more likely to implement CBI-reforms. This suggests that
CBI-reforms are more common when policymakers fear that they soon will
be replaced. Hence, CBI-reforms seem to be implemented in order to tie the
hands of incoming governments.
Note, however, that this e⁄ect is not present among the more industri-
alized countries. In addition, in the non-OECD sample, the results indicate
that CBI-reforms are more likely in countries that often change their polit-
ical regime.
The number of CBI-reforms in period t￿1 in the European Union (EU)
and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) also seem to in-
￿ uence the likelihood that policymakers in member countries delegate power
to independent central banks. It thus seem to exist geographical clustering
in time, i.e., countries in the same economic cooperation seem more likely
to give up power to independent central banks if many other countries in
the same cooperation recently have implemented CBI-reforms.
196 Conclusions
It is something of a puzzle that politicians in a large number of countries
recently have chosen to delegate power to independent central banks, thereby
reducing their ability to ￿ne-tune the economy. This paper should be seen as
a ￿rst attempt to empirically investigate why political policymakers choose
to give up power to independent central banks.
The lack of compiled data on the occurrence of CBI-reforms can probably
explain why no previous study has investigated why politicians choose to
delegate power to independent central banks. Therefore, we have collected
and analyzed dates on the possible occurence of such institutional reforms
in 119 countries during the period 1980-2005. The results presented in the
paper showed that 81 of these countries (i.e., 68 percent) had implemented
an institutional reform that granted the central bank more independence
from the political policymakers during the study period. Hence, the launch
of institutional reforms that formally increase CBI seem to be one of the most
signi￿cant trends in international politics in recent time. It also illustrates
the in￿ uence of the time-inconsistency literature on policy outcomes around
the world.
To investigate why policymakers implement central bank independence
reforms, a random-e⁄ects probit regression model was estimated. According
to the results presented in the paper, policymakers are more likely to for-
mally grant their central bank with more independence if the foreign debt
is relatively high. This support results previously presented by Max￿eld
(1997), indicating that policymakers choose to give up power to indepen-
20dent central banks in order to signal creditworthiness to foreign investors.
It is, moreover, found that non-OECD countries that are characterized by a
high degree of political fragmentation and variation in political freedom are
more likely to implement CBI-reforms. This probably indicates that the fear
of loosing power induce policymakers in these countries to delegate power
to independent central banks. Finally, the likelihood of a CBI-reform in
the European Union (EU) and the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA) increased when other countries in the same economic cooperation
recently have granted the central bank more legal independence; implying
that there also exist spatial determinants of CBI-reforms.
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Full sample OECD sample Non-OECD
Variable Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
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Unemployment 8.17 3.82 7.14 3.90 8.48 3.74
Liquid liabilities 0.47 0.29 0.66 0.33 0.41 0.24
Foreign debt 68899 142620 23703 62164 82377 156419
Pol fragmentation 5624 1753 6676 1252 5310 1759
Federation 0.09 0.29 0.26 0.44 0.04 0.19
Freedom 1.82 0.70 1.20 0.52 2.01 0.63
Var. Freedom 0.15 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.18 0.22
CBI-index 35.52 8.58 36.91 15.11 35.10 5.18
CBI EU 0.08 0.62 0.25 1.06 0.03 0.40
CBI AEC 0.08 0.36 0 0 0.11 0.41
CBI APEC 0.03 0.19 0.07 0.28 0.02 0.15
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Number of countries 118 30 88
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GDP (L) 0.007 0.78 -0.034 -1.80 0.017 0.83
Unemployment (L) 0.011 0.68 -0.018 -0.62 0.011 0.56
Liquid assets (L) 0.14 0.64 0.61 1.67 -0.11 -0.35
Foreign debt (L) 0.011 2.67 0.041 2.18 0.010 2.31
Pol fragmentation 0.072 1.92 0.051 0.47 0.079 1.86
Federation (D) -0.29 -1.29 -0.19 -0.50 -0.26 -0.80
High freedom (D) 0.20 1.31 0.48 0.99 0.15 0.85
Low freedom (D) 0.23 1.40 0.61 0.98 0.22 0.17
Var. Freedom 0.41 1.93 0.18 0.30 0.48 2.04
CBI-index 0.001 0.17 -0.006 -0.67 0.019 1.43
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CBI AEC (L) 0.15 1.25 - - 0.16 1.28
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Figure 3: Number of central bank independence reforms in non-OECD
countries.Appendix
Table A1: Year of possible CBI-reform in 119 countries
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Afganisthan 2003 Cap Verde None Georgia 1995
Albania 1998 Cent. Af. States None Germany None
Argentina 1992 Chad None Ghana None
Australia 1996 Chile 1989 Greece 1997
Austria 1998 China None Guatemala 2002
Azerbaijan 2004 Colombia 1992 Guyana 1998
Bahamas 2000 Comoros None Honduras 1996
Bahrain None Costa Rica Hungary 1991
Bangladesh None Croatia 2001 Iceland 2001
Barbados None Cyprus 2002 Iran 2005
Belarus None Czech Republic 1993 Ireland 1998
Belgium 1999 Denmark None Israel None
Belize None Djibouti 2005 Italy 1998
Bhutan None Dominican Rep 2002 Jamaica None
Bolivia 1995 Ecuador 1992 Japan 1998
Bosnia 1997 Egypt None Jordan None
Botswana None El Salvador 1991 Kazakhstan 2005
Brazil None Estonia 2004 Kenya None
Brunei None Ethiopia None Korea 2003
Bulgaria 2005 Fiji None Kuwait None
Burundi None Finland 1998 Lao None
Cambodia None France 1993 Latvia 2002
Canada None Gambia 2005 Lesotho 2000Table A1 (continued): Year of possible CBI-reform in 119 countries
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Lithuania 2001 Seychelles 2004 Venezuela 1995
Luxemburg 1998 Slovak Rep 1993 Vietnam 1997
Madagascar 1994 Slovenia 2002 Zambia None
Maldives None Solomon Isl None Zimbabwe None
Malta 2002 South Africa 1996
Mauritius 2004 Spain 1994
Mexico 1994 Sri Lanka 2002
Namibia 2004 Suriname 2005
Nepal 2002 Swaziland None
Netherlands 1998 Sweden 1999
New Zealand 1989 Switzerland 2004
Nicaragua 1992 Syrian None
Nigeria 1999 Tanzania 1995
Norway 2003 Thailand None
Pakistan 1997 Trinidad None
New Guinea 2000 Tunisia 2006
Paraguay 1995 Turkey 2001
Peru 1993 Uganda 1993
Philippines 1993 United Arab Em, 1980
Poland 1998 United Kingdom 1998
Portugal 1998 United States None
Romania 2004 Uruguay 1995
Samoa 2003 Vanuatu None